

Amy Selvaraj (DELWP)

From: Andrew Helps [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, 10 February 2021 11:38 AM
To: Amy Selvaraj (DELWP)
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: Significant changes to the KALBAR operational equipment list
Attachments: 8344.pdf; 8319Rev4.pdf; 8330 Rev 33.pdf; 10022021110145.pdf

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EXTERNAL SENDER: Links and attachments may be unsafe.

Amy and Anthony.

Please find attached my comments re the proposed use of centrifuges by Kalbar at the Lindenow mine site.

I would like the opportunity to talk to both of you face to face on this critical issue.

Please inform me of a suitable time and place and I will come into the City for this meeting.

Kindest Regards

Andrew Helps

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Mobile [REDACTED]
UNEP Global Mercury Partnership
Waste Management Partnership - designated expert
Mercury added products and alternatives – designated expert
Mercury Fate and Transport Group

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Good morning Amy and Anthony,

I hold grave concerns with the KALBAR proposal to use centrifuges in their processing operation. The KALBAR ore body has a number of Radionuclides (RADNUC's) of concern in the ore body.

As the Chinese miners (who were early adopters of the uses of centrifuges in Rare Earth mines have discovered) unless you know on a minute by minute basis the actual metals content (speciation) of the ore being fed into the centrifuges you are heading towards a limited and very brief life span along with a large number of nearby residents and workers.

The real problem is the presence of Zirconium in the ore stream and hence the processing plant dust stream.

Zirconium in the dust stream from a crusher plant will ignite at 20 degrees C. My Colleagues in the Chinese Environment Bureau tell me that 4kg of dust from a centrifuge is the equivalent of a kg of prilled ammonium nitrate mixed with AVTUR..

The US EPA (EPA.Gov) has extensive data on this subject and it is of grave concern that KALBAR's consultants have not referenced this data base for the benefit of the Lindenow community. This was probably because it was an awkward truth!

I suggest that you inform you self by loading down from the US EPA website a copy of the following document: Evaluation of Guidelines to Technologically Enhanced Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials <http://nap.edu/catalog/6360.html>

Because of this failure by KALBAR's consultants to provide their advice on RADNUC issues (probably because they are not experienced in this area) the Lindenow the Gippsland Lakes RAMSAR and indeed the entire East Gippsland community will be put at risk if the KALBAR mine is permitted by your Department.

I have further concerns with the fact that the KALBAR consultants have not mentioned in their reports the explosive characteristics of the dust that will be emitted by the operational KALBAR Mine.

There was a very serious accident in China at a large REE mine in central west China in the Northern hemisphere Summer of 2010.

When I was at the UNEP Minamata Conference in Kumamoto Japan in 2013 (Which I chaired for the UNEP Secretary General) the Chinese representatives showed us footage of the explosion site – 57 site workers killed. Tracked excavators and Bulldozers were overturned by the blast, burned out and had all their aluminium and brass components melted!

The plant was destroyed and 20 children at a nearby primary school critically injured – 7 later died. The Chinese have never re-activated this mine – they now prefer to buy their REE's from overseas.

After a team of experts from Beijing had conducted what we would call a coronial enquiry, the mine manager and the mine engineer were publicly executed in front of a crowd of nearly 1,000 people.

This is a level of mine managerial responsibility we do not have in Australia unfortunately (GBM mining Bendigo comes to mind here with at least two reported mine related arsenic cancer deaths each year for a mine that the Government holds a \$ 6 million rehabilitation bond for).

If I was performing due diligence on the KALBAR proposal for one of the Global Investment NGO's (a task that I have often carried out over the last 40 years), the first document that I would look for would be the projects Radionuclide Carcinogenicity Slope Factor Table.

KALBAR would not even understand what this table is let alone have the skills or be able to buy the skills in Australia to compile such a document. To save time I have compiled this table (my file#8319 xlsx dated 15/01/2021.

It is interesting to note that KALBAR never refer to Carcinogens in any discussion of the metals in their ore body. This leads to 2 critical, as yet unanswered questions:

Question 1. Does any senior executive in KALBAR understand the issues with carcinogenic metals in ore bodies?

Question 2. If the honest answer to question #1 (and I doubt that we will get anything approaching an honest answer from KALBAR) is NO then where is the roadmap from KALBAR to bring their senior managers skill set up to the required level from what is clearly a zero base.

The Lindenow Community do not have the time to wait for this answer.

This situation leads to an interesting situation with two options:

1. KALBAR have hired the consultants that they wanted to hire not the consultants that they needed to hire.
2. That KALBAR have been given data on prospective consultants in the mining sector by other mining companies that have no understanding of the complex issues involved in setting up a highly toxic and carcinogenic metal mine in a RAMSAR catchment.

My view is that KALBAR probably adopted option 1 because they were "new entrants" in this mining sector and were unsure if others in the mining encampment were being honest with them - this was a reasonable assumption.

Kalbar and their consultants are clearly new entrants to the REE mining sector and this lack of experience has detracted from the quality and veracity of the data that supports their EES.

This failure by KALBAR if it was presented to a competent tribunal would result in the project proposal being denied.

The Non-KALBAR independent surface ore body data.

My first involvement with the rapidly emerging KALBAR issues was when a number of the Lindenow farmers asked me to chair and speak at a public information session that they had organised at the Lindenow public hall in 2019.

I have compiled the attached table (File 8319.xlsx) which shows the Radionuclide Carcinogenicity Slope Factors. This data comes from the US EPA Federal Guidance Report No.13 Morbidity Risk Coefficients.

I respectfully suggest that you would be very wise not to ignore the data in this spreadsheet as it will be critical in future coronial enquiries into premature deaths in the Lindenow community with particular emphasis on infants and still births.

Kalbar are obviously unaware of this issue which will become of critical importance when as the development of the mine progresses and these toxic dusts particles impact the Lindenow community and the wider east Gippsland community.

I have put the relevant data from ENVIROLAB Analysis #22941 dated 16/10/2021 into this table. I took these samples at the Lindenow mine site on the 13th of October 2020.

THE SITE Fire Risk.

I have seen no information from KALBAR that informs me that they (KALBAR) understand the fire risks with the excavated ore body.

I would think that there are possibly two explanations for this failure:

1. KALBAR's consultants desire to please their client KALBAR under any circumstance.
2. That the KABAR consultants do not have the funds to buy a copy of the key reference Marks Standard Handbook For Engineers ISBN0-07-004997-1

If KALBARS consultants did have access to this handbook, they could have informed their advice by looking at Sections 7-24 and 7-25 (copy attached) which deal with the Explosive Characteristics of Various Dusts (Table 7.1.24).

If the KALBAR consultants had looked at the Metals section on page 7-24 (and I am presuming here that the consultants have access to this sort of critical reference) then some form of alarm should have been raised by the data on Metals.

The KALBAR consultants have not raised this issue as far as I can see. I can only conclude that the KALBAR consultants were either incompetent or under instructions not to raise this issue.

3. Synopsis.

As you will see when you look at page 7-25 of the above referenced document you will notice the following alarming data:

- 3.1 Zirconium dust cloud Ignition temperature at 20 degrees Centigrade.
- 3.2 Uranium dust cloud Ignition temperature at 20 degrees Centigrade.
- 3.3 Vanadium dust cloud ignition temperature at 500 degrees centigrade.
- 3.4 Aluminium – dust cloud ignition temperature at 650 degrees centigrade, my last tests at 12,000 ug/L and 43,000 ug/L .
- 3.5 Thorium – my last test at 5 ug/l dust cloud ignition temperature 270 degrees centigrade.

A moderately slow grass fire in a medium fuel load (as was demonstrated in the 1983 Ash Wednesday fire) is capable of generating enough radiant heat to melt a steel motor car body (880 degrees C).

FINAL Comments.

I am fully aware that ERR will approve this mine in order to please the Minister and The Premier. The simple logic of this approval is that it will create about 250 jobs in east Gippsland for CFMEU members.

My time to put this letter to you today is that I can at least say at the inevitable Coronial Inquiry following deaths from the inhalation of radioactive dust at in the perimeter of the Lindenow mine that I had warned the ERR Department via this letter that this would happen.

I realise that you will not respond in any meaningful way to this letter so I will just wait to provide evidence at the eventual Coronial enquiry.

Sincerely

Andrew Helps
UNEP Delegated toxic metal expert to the Minamata Convention on Mercury.

Signed Hard Copy by registered mail.

Radionuclide Table: Radionuclide Carcinogenicity - Slope Factors

Data Source US EPA Federal Guidance Report No. 13 Morbidity Risk Coefficients, in Units of Picocuries

Revision #2

File: 8319.xlsx
20/08/2020

HBTOM

The curie (Ci) is the customary unit of activity and is equal to 3.7×10^{10} nuclear transformations per second.
Handbook of the Toxicology of Metals (Nordberg ET AL) 4th Edition

NOTE:

US EPA Regulates radium in drinking water to no more than 5 pCi of combined radium-226 and radium 228 per litre of water.

Slope Factor Morbidity Risk Coefficient
Lifetime excess Total Cancer Risk

Element	Kalbar Analysis	Element (Atomic Number)	HBTOM * Reference Pagess	Isotope	Radioactive Half Life (Years)	ICRP Lung Type	Gi Absorption Factor (f ₁) ⁹	Water Ingestion (Risk/pCi)	Food Ingestion (Risk/pCi)	Soil Ingestion (Risk/pCi)	Inhalation Risk (Risk/pCi)	External Exposure (Risk/y per pCi/g)	
Aluminium	260-4500 mg/kg	13	549-560	Al-26	716000	M	0.0100	0.001730	2490	0.47000	0.000000000069	0.0000133	
				Al-28	2.240							0.0000092	
Antimony	<0.5 mg/kg Carcinogen		565-572	Sb 115	31.80	M	0.1000	0.00000000000051	0.00000000000001	0.11600	0.00000000000002	0.0000039	
				Sb 116	15.80	M	0.1000	0.00000000000051	0.00000000000001	0.11600	0.00000000000002	0.0000105	
		51		Sb-126	12.40	M	0.10000	0.000000000001	0.000000000002	0.29	0.0000000000115	0.00000649	
				Sb 127	3.85	M	0.1000	0.000000000001	0.0000000000147	0.00000000003	0.000000000008	0.00000307	
Arsenic	61-491 mg/kg Carcinogen	33	582-610	As-69	15.20	M	0.50	0.00000000000105	0.00000000000015	0.2390	0.00000000000004	0.00000443	
				As-70	52.60	M	0.50	0.00000000000320	0.00000000000045	0.000000000001	0.0000000000014	0.0000196	
				As-71	64.80	M	0.50	0.00000000000320	0.000000000003	0.000000000001	0.0000000000152	0.00000237	
				As-72	26.00	M	0.50	0.10	0.000000000001	0.000000000003	0.000000000004	0.000000000004	0.0000082
				As-73	80.30	M	0.50	0.000000000002	0.000000000002	0.000000000004	0.000000000004	0.000000000004	0.00000006
				As-74	17.80	M	0.50	0.000000000007	0.000000000010	0.000000000002	0.000000000001	0.000000000001	0.0000034
				As-76	26.30	M	0.50	0.000000000010	0.000000000001	0.000000000003	0.000000000000	0.000000000000	0.0000020
				As-77	38.80	M	0.50	0.000000000003	0.000000000004	0.000000000001	0.000000000002	0.000000000002	0.000000036
				As-78	90.70	M	0.50	0.000000000006	0.000000000009	0.000000000001	0.000000000003	0.000000000003	0.0000061
Thorium	1.0 -120 mg/kg Carcinogen	90		Th-226	30.90	m S	0.001	0.000000000001	0.00000000000923	0.0000000000016	0.000000000016	0.00000002	
				Th-227	18.70	d S	0.0005	0.000000000005	0.000000000005	0.000000000007	0.000000000014	0.00000004	
				Th-228	1.91	y S	0.001	0.000000000001	0.000000000001	0.000000000029	0.000000013	0.00000001	
				Th-228+D	1.91	y S	0.001	0.000000000003	0.000000000004	0.000000000081	0.000000014	0.00000076	
				In Kalbar ore body	Th-229	7340.00	y S	0.001	0.000000000002	0.000000000003	0.000000000050	0.00000018	0.00000023
				See pages 38-40 of TENORM Handbook	Th-229+D	7340.00	y S	0.001	0.000000000005	0.000000000007	0.00000000129	0.00000023	0.00000117
					Th-230	77000.00	y S	0.001	0.000000000001	0.0000000000119	0.000000000020	0.00000003	0.00000000
					Th-231	25.50	h S	0.001	0.000000000000	0.000000000003	0.000000000001	0.000000000002	0.00000002
				Decays to Radium 228	Th-232	14 Billion Years	y S	7340.00	0.000000000001	0.0000000000133	0.000000000023	0.00000004	0.000000003
					Th-234	24.10	d S	0.001	0.000000000000	0.000000000034	0.000000000007	0.000000000003	0.00000002
Tin	1.7 mg/kg	50	1242-1276	Sn-110	4.00	h M	0.020	0.0000000000019	0.000000000003	0.000000000005	0.0000000000067	0.000001130	
				Sn-111	35.30	m M	0.020	0.0000000000019	0.0000000000008	0.000000000000	0.0000000000003	0.000002290	
				Sn-113	115.00	d M	0.020	0.0000000000019	0.000000000006	0.000000000012	0.0000000001000	0.000000020	
				Sn-117m	13.60	d M	0.020	0.0000000000019	0.000000000001	0.000000000013	0.0000000000884	0.000000469	
				Sn-119m	293.00	d M	0.020	0.0000000000019	0.000000000003	0.000000000006	0.0000000000781	0.000000001	
				Sn-121	27.10	h M	0.020	0.0000000000019	0.000000000015	0.000000000004	0.0000000000102	0.000000000	
				Sn-121m	55.00	y M	0.020	0.0000000000019	0.000000000023	0.000000000007	0.0000000001540	0.000000001	
				Sn-123	129.00	d M	0.020	0.0000000000019	0.0000000000140	0.000000000040	0.0000000003030	0.000000039	
				Sn-123m	40.10	m M	0.020	0.0000000000019	0.0000000000001	0.000000000000	0.0000000000006	0.000000462	
				Sn-125	9.64	d M	0.020	0.0000000000019	0.0000000000201	0.000000000058	0.0000000001410	0.000001530	
				Sn-126	100000.00	y M	0.020	0.0000000000019	0.0000000000256	0.000000000071	0.0000000009950	0.00000100	
				Sn-127	2.10	h M	0.020	0.0000000000019	0.000000000008	0.000000000002	0.0000000000044	0.000009250	
				Sn-128	59.10	m M	0.020	0.0000000000019	0.000000000004	0.000000000001	0.0000000000023	0.000002620	
				Titanium	44-154 mg/kg Carcinogen	22		Ti-44	47.30	S	0.01000	0.0000000000026	0.000000000004
Ti-45	3.08	S	0.0100					0.0000000000006	0.000000000009	0.000000000018	0.000000000003	0.00000379	
Tungsten	<1 mg/Kg	74		W-176	2.30	h F	0.3000	0.0000000000004	0.000000000001	0.000000000011	0.000000000001	0.00000032	

			W-177	135.00	m F	0.3000	0.0000000000002	0.000000000000	0.0000000000005	0.0000000000001	0.00000363
			W-178	21.70	d	0.3000	0.0000000000012	0.300000000000	0.0000000000033	0.0000000000004	0.00000002
			W-179	37.50	m F	0.3000	0.0000000000000	0.000000000000	0.0000000000000	0.0000000000000	0.00000006
			W-181	121.00	d F	0.3000	0.0000000000004	0.0000000000001	0.0000000000011	0.0000000000001	0.00000005
			W-185	75.10	d F	0.3000	0.0000000000029	0.0000000000004	0.0000000000084	0.0000000000009	0.00000000
			W-187	23.90	h F	0.3000	0.0000000000037	0.0000000000005	0.0000000000103	0.0000000000011	0.00000204
			W-188	69.40	d F	0.3000	0.0000000000140	0.0000000000021	0.0000000000400	0.0000000000005	0.00000001
Uranium	3-9 mg/kg Carcinogen	234	U-230	20.80	d M	0.0200	0.0000000002090	0.0000000002980	0.0000000005660	0.0000000455000	0.000000003
			U-231	4.20	d M	0.0200	0.0000000000018	0.0000000000026	0.0000000000050	0.0000000000018	0.00000016
			U-232	72.00	y M	0.0200	0.0000000002920	0.0000000003850	0.0000000005740	0.0000000195000	0.000000001
			U-233	159000	y M	0.0200	0.0000000000718	0.0000000000969	0.0000000001600	0.0000000116000	0.000000000
			U-234	245000.00	y M	0.0200	0.0000000000707	0.0000000000955	0.0000000001580	0.0000000114000	0.000000000
			U-235	704000000	y M	0.0200	0.0000000000696	0.0000000000944	0.0000000001570	0.0000000101000	0.000000052
			U-235+D	704000000	y M	0.0200	0.0000000000718	0.0000000000976	0.0000000001630	0.0000000101000	0.000000054
			U-236	234000000	Y M	0.0200	0.0000000000670	0.0000000000903	0.0000000001490	0.0000000105000	0.000000000
			U-237	6.75	d M	0.0200	0.0000000000049	0.0000000000071	0.0000000000139	0.0000000000064	0.000000038
			U-238	4470000000	y M	0.0200	0.0000000000640	0.0000000000866	0.0000000001430	0.0000000093200	0.000000000
			U-238+D	4470000000	y M	0.0200	0.0000000000871	0.0000000001210	0.0000000002100	0.0000000093500	0.000000011
			U-239	23.50	m M	0.0200	0.0000000000001	0.0000000000001	0.0000000000002	0.0000000000001	0.000000012
			U-240	14.10	h M	0.0200	0.0000000000070	0.0000000000103	0.0000000000202	0.0000000000030	0.000000000
			Vanadium	17-130 mg/kg Carcinogen	V-47	32.60	m M	0.0100	0.0000000000001	0.0000000000002	0.0000000000003
V48	16.20	d M			0.0100	0.0000000000081	0.0000000000117	0.0000000000213	0.0000000000093	0.00001400	
V49	330.00	d M			0.0100	0.0000000000001	0.0000000000002	0.0000000000004	0.0000000000001	0.000000000	
Zirconium	6,250-42,750 mg/kg Carcinogen	40	Zr-97	16.90	m	0.0100	0.0000000000125	0.0000000000183	0.0000000000375	0.0000000000005	0.0000008620
				70kg Male	Inhalation of	50.4 M ³	Per Day				

Explosive Characteristics of Various Dusts* (Continued)

Type of dust	Ignition temperature of dust cloud, °C	Minimum igniting energy, J	Minimum explosive concentration, oz/ft ³	Maximum explosion pressure, lb/in ² gage	Maximum rate of pressure rise, lb/(m ²)(s)	Terminal oxygen concentration, %†
ounds (Continued):						
C ₆ H ₄ (CO) ₂ NH	630	0.050	0.030	79	4,500	
tartrate, KHC ₄ H ₄ O ₆	520					
o, o-HOC ₆ H ₄ CONHC ₆ H ₅	610	0.020	0.040	61	4,400	
sulfate, anhydrous, Na ₂ S ₂ O ₃	510					
	470	0.015	0.020	88	10,000+	
H ₂ COOH						
H ₂₂ O ₁₁	420	0.040	0.045	82	4,200	14
0% finer than 44 μm	210	0.020	0.045	56	3,100	
rg particle size 4 μm	190	0.015	0.035	78	4,700	12
ylsalicylic acid),	660	0.025	0.050	83	10,000+	
C ₆ H ₄ COOH, fine						
xyhydric alcohol),	460	0.040	0.065	82	2,800	
(OH) ₄ CH ₂ OH						
sodium,	520	0.960	0.100	54	500	
Na						
corbic acid,	460	0.060	0.070	88	4,800	15
related compounds:						
nide	500	0.045	0.040	94	6,500	
c acid	460	0.045	0.040	92	4,300	
iphenyl-urea	550	0.060	0.095	87	2,500	
nilide)						
ide (3,5-dinitro-ortho-	500	0.015	0.050	106	10,000-	13
	650	0.015	0.045	100	10,000+	2
	420	1.920	0.420	8	100	16
	470	0.060	0.100	90	2,400	
	570	4.000				
	580	0.140	0.230	56	5,000	14
	760					
	900					
	420	0.020	0.100	46	6,000	10
	710					
	520	0.020	0.020	94	10,000+	0
	720					
	950+					
	950+					
	780	0.080	0.100	106	10,000+	12
	630	0.120	0.200	51	3,700	
	550					
	270	0.005	0.075	48	3,300	0
	630	0.080	0.190	37	1,300	15
	460	0.010	0.045	80	10,000+	0
	950+					
	20	0.045	0.060	53	3,400	0
	500	0.060	0.220	48	600	13
	600	0.640	0.480	48	1,800	9
	20	0.005	0.045	65	9,000	0
ounds:						
alt	950	0.100	0.180	78	8,500	
per	930	1.920	0.280	27	500	
	550	0.720	0.500	21	100	
esium	430	0.020	0.020	90	10,000	0
el	940	0.080	0.190	79	10,000	14
on, 12% Si	670	0.060	0.040	74	7,500	
	540	0.130	0.060	73	10,000+	8
, high-carbon	790		2.000			19
, medium-carbon	450	0.080	0.130	47	4,200	
% Si	860	0.400	0.420	87	3,600	16
ow-carbon	370	0.080	0.140	53	9,500	13

Table 7.1.24 Explosive Characteristics of Various Dusts* (Continued)

Type of dust	Ignition temperature of dust cloud, °C	Minimum igniting energy, J	Minimum explosive concentration, oz/ft ³	Maximum explosion pressure, lb/in ² gage	Maximum rate of pressure rise, lb/(m ²)(s)	Terminal oxygen concentration, %†
Alloys and compounds (Continued):						
Ferrovandium	440	0.400	1.300			17
Thorium hydride	260	0.003	0.080	60	6,500	6
Titanium hydride	440	0.060	0.070	96	10,000+	13
Uranium hydride	20	0.005	0.060	43	6,500	0
Zirconium hydride	350	0.060	0.085	69	9,000	8
Plastics:						
Acetal resin (polyformaldehyde)	440	0.020	0.035	89	4,100	11
Acrylic polymer resin	480	0.010	0.030	85	6,000	11
Methyl methacrylate-ethyl acrylate						
Alkyd resin	500	0.120	0.155	15	150	15
Alkyd molding compound						
Allyl resin, allyl alcohol derivative, CR-39	500	0.020	0.035	106	10,000+	13
Amino resin, urea-formaldehyde molding compound	450	0.080	0.075	89	3,600	17
Cellulosic fillers, wood flour	430	0.020	0.035	110	5,500	17
Cellulosic resin, ethyl cellulose molding compound	320	0.010	0.025	102	6,000	11
Chlorinated polyether resin, chlorinated polyether alcohol	460	0.160	0.045	66	1,000	
Cold-molded resin, petroleum resin	510	0.030	0.025	94	4,600	
Coumarone-indene resin	520	0.010	0.015	93	10,000+	14
Epoxy resin	530	0.020	0.020	86	6,000	12
Fluorocarbon resin, fluorethylene polymer	600					
Furane resin, phenol furfural	520	0.010	0.025	90	8,500	14
Ingredients, hexamethylenetetramine	410	0.010	0.015	98	10,000+	14
Miscellaneous resins, petrin acrylate monomer	220	0.020	0.045	104	10,000+	
Natural resin, rosin, DK	390	0.010	0.015	87	10,000+	14
Nylon polymer resin	500	0.020	0.030	89	7,000	13
Phenolic resin, phenol-formaldehyde molding compound	500	0.020	0.030	92	10,000+	14
Polycarbonate resin	710	0.020	0.025	78	4,700	15
Polyester resin, polyethylene terephthalate	500	0.040	0.040	91	5,500	13
Polyethylene resin	410	0.010	0.020	83	5,000	12
Polymethylene resin, carboxypolyethylene	520	0.640	0.115	70	5,500	
Polypropylene resin	420	0.030	0.020	76	5,000	
Polyurethane resin, polyurethane foam	510	0.020	0.025	88	3,700	
Rayon (viscose) flock	520	0.240	0.055	88	1,700	
Rubber, synthetic	320	0.030	0.030	93	3,100	15
Styrene polymer resin, polystyrene latex	500	0.020	0.020	91	7,000	13
Vinyl polymer resin, polyvinyl butyral	390	0.010	0.020	84	2,000	14

* Data taken from the following Bureau of Mines Reports of Investigations: RI 5753, "Explosibility of Agricultural Dusts"; RI 5971, "Explosibility of Dusts Used in the Plastics Industry"; RI 6516, "Explosibility of Metal Powders"; RI 7132, "Dust Explosibility of Chemicals, Drugs, Dyes and Pesticides"; RI 7208, "Explosibility of Miscellaneous Dusts." The data were obtained using the equipment described in RI 5624, "Laboratory Equipment and Test Procedures for Evaluating Explosibility of Dusts."

† The terminal oxygen concentration is the limiting oxygen concentration in air-CO₂ atmosphere required to prevent ignition of dust clouds by electric spark.

Experiments show the maximum rate of pressure rise in a highly turbulent dust-air mixture can be as much as 8 times higher than in a nonturbulent mixture (*BuMines Repts. Inv. 5815 and 7507 and Nagy and Verakis*).

Moisture and Other Inerts Moisture in a dust absorbs heat and tends to reduce the explosibility of a dust. A high concentration of moisture in the dust also tends to reduce the dispersibility of a dust. An increase in moisture content causes an increase in ignition temperature and a reduction in maximum pressure and rates of pressure rise. However, the amount of moisture required to produce a marked lowering of the explosibility parameters is higher than can ordinarily be tolerated in industrial processes. Most mineral inert dusts admixed with a combustible absorb heat during the combustion reaction and reduce explosibility similar to the action of water. Some chemical compounds, such as sodium and potassium carbonates, act as inhibitors and are more effective than mineral inerts; the limiting inert dust concentration required to prevent ignition and explosion depends on the strength of the igniting source.

Atmospheric Oxygen Concentration The pressure and rate of pressure development decrease as the oxygen concentration in the atmosphere decreases. The ignition sensitivity of dusts decreases with decrease in oxygen concentration and for most dusts, ignition and explosion can be prevented by reducing the oxygen concentration to a safe value. Carbon dioxide, nitrogen, argon, helium, and water vapor are effective diluents. For highly reactive metal powders, only argon and helium are chemically inert. Limiting oxygen concentrations using carbon dioxide as a diluent are given in Table 7.1.24 for many dusts. With carbon dioxide as a diluent, a reduction of oxygen in the atmosphere to 11 percent is sufficient to prevent ignition by sparks for all dusts tested except the metallic powders. With nitrogen as the diluent, ignition of nonmetallic dusts is prevented by diluting the atmosphere to 8 percent oxygen. Some metal dusts, such as magnesium, titanium, and zirconium, ignite by spark in a pure carbon dioxide atmosphere. Freon and halons are sometimes used as diluent gases, but if metal dusts are involved, they can intensify rather than suppress ignition. The limiting oxygen concentration decreases as the dust becomes finer in particle